












Capital Structure Arbitrage – exploiting temporary 
mispricing between equity prices and CDS spreads 















Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for 







This study implements a capital structure arbitrage strategy using the CreditGrades model and 
checks whether this is able to generate excess returns. Using a new methodology to identify 
mispricing triggers, and taking the EuroStoxx and a European Large Cap Bond Index as our 
benchmark portfolios, we find that our strategy is able to produce a significant alpha during the 
period between 2008 and 2015 (2.3% in annualized terms). We find however that our strategy 
is very dependent on trading opportunities, which tend to occur only when volatility rises above 
certain levels. In periods of prolonged low volatility, our strategy tends to generate weaker 
returns. As example, while in the period between 2008 and 2011 we obtain a significant annual 
alpha of 5.7%, in the period between 2012 and 2015 our alpha is only 0.25% and not statistically 
different from 0.  Therefore, we can conclude our strategy is not able to deliver constant and 
significant abnormal returns in all periods. 
 
Abstract Portuguese 
A presente dissertação visa implementar uma estratégia assente em oportunidades de 
arbitragem relativas à estrutura de capital. Para tal, recorremos ao modelo CreditGrades e de 
seguida procuramos apurar se tal estratégia é capaz de gerar retornos incrementais. Sugerimos 
uma nova metodologia para identificar fatores que possam desviar os preços dos seus valores 
teoricamente justos e utilizamos o índice EuroStoxx e European Large Cap Bond Index como 
portfolios de referencia. Concluimos pelos resultados encontrados que a estratégia apresentada 
é capaz de gerar um alfa de 2.3% anualizado entre 2008 e 2015.Não obstante, reconhecemos 
que a estratégia que apresentamos depende de oportunidades de arbitragem existentes no 
mercado, as quais são mais comuns em períodos de aumento de volatilidade. Durante períodos 
de volatilidade contida, a estratégia que propomos apresenta resultados menos promissores. 
Entre 2008 e 2011 obtemos um alfa de 5.7%, enquanto que entre 2012 e 2015 registamos um 
valor inferior, de 0.25%, o qual é estatisticamente insignificante. Face a estes resultados, 
concluímos que a estratégia apresentada não é capaz de gerar retornos constantes e 
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The last years have been characterized by risk free interest rates near or even below zero in the 
case of shorter-term maturities. In such an environment, traditional strategies such as carry 
trades and riding the yield curve1 are no longer able to generate interesting returns, especially 
in the case of investment grade bonds. As result, several authors have pointed that this context 
is particularly favourable to the so-called search for yield, see Buch et al. (2011).  
Possibly further contributing to this search for yield is the implementation of aggressive 
quantitative easing programs by all major central banks together with forward guidance in terms 
of future interest rates. These programs have contributed to create additional demand for 
sovereign and high rated corporate debt. As a result, private investors have been pushed to the 
high yield space or to very long maturities where one can still find some return at the cost of 
additional risk. This should be affecting both the shape of the yield curve and the market price 
of risk. The increasing demand in longer dated maturities is leading to a flatter yield curve, 
while the larger demand for high yield products may be further contributing to a reduction in 
the market price of risk, resulting in a compression in credit spreads. Ultimately, both 
developments lead to an increase in asset prices as pointed by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011) and Joyce et al. (2012). This increase in asset prices comes however with 
substantial drawbacks in terms of risk. Though interest rates for several important benchmark 
rates have dropped already well into negative territory no one really knows whether they have 
already hit rock bottom or if they can go further negative. According to Coeuré Benoît (2015).  
we are very close or even at the lower boundary. This gives reason to see betting on further 
decreases in interest rates, especially through long term bonds, as a strategy having a long left 
skewed return distribution. In addition, a sudden reversal in the market price of risk and the 
following spike in yields could generate enormous losses for traditional fixed income investors. 
In this context, fixed income investors are currently thinking on implementing new 
trading strategies to deliver a return on investment compatible with their targets. In this article 
we examine if a capital structure arbitrage strategy is capable of producing stable and positive 
returns even in the current low interest rate environment. Capital structure arbitrage has been 
very popular with hedge funds as it should be able to deliver stable and constant returns in every 
                                                          
1 Carry trading consists of buying a bond and collecting its coupons until maturity, while riding the yield curve 
refers to a strategy where investors buy a long maturity bond and sell it after the price has increased due to 




phase of the market. The idea is to build a model for firm assets and conditional on this model 
find the price of several contingent claims, whose prices are available in the market, notably 
equity, credit-default swaps and option contracts. As debt and equity are seen as different 
derivatives of the same underlying, they must trade within a given range to each other and move 
together. Capital structural arbitrage strategies assume these differences are temporary and try 
to exploit them. In other words, the strategy consists of betting on the convergence between the 
observed prices and the ones given by the model. In the context of capital structure arbitrage, 
violations in this pricing relationship are seen as temporary and motivated by a different pace 
of price discovery. As further developed in section 2.2, in theory some markets (e.g. equity 
market) may incorporate new information faster than others (corporate bond markets) simply 
because they are more liquid, transparent, homogenous and have more participants. We may 
also have different investors in different asset classes that react differently on the same news. 
This may justify temporary violations in foreseen relations between contingent asset prices. 
Capital Structure Arbitrage simply intends to exploit this violation of the law of one price. 
Underlying capital structure arbitrage are the so-called structural models of corporate 
liabilities, which find their roots on the seminal Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) 
papers. The literature on structural models of contingent liabilities is vast and has several 
purposes. The largest stream of the literature focuses on credit risk. Similar to traditional credit 
analysis, these models try to determine the probability of default and the appropriate credit 
spread of any obligor. However, while traditional credit analysis does it by using mostly balance 
sheet data, structural models focus on observed market prices. The fact that market prices 
should incorporate all available information should lead structural models to have, in theory, a 
superior performance over traditional credit analysis. After Leland (1994),  structural models 
started also to be used to find the optimal capital structure of a firm. In the end of the nineties 
with the development of CDS markets and its boom phase during the first decade of the new 
century, the ability to trade debt increased drastically allowing the use of structural models also 
within the trading business. As one could now trade debt at given spreads, structural models 
could be used to judge if debt of any obligor was rich or cheap relatively to its equity price.  
This master thesis implements a sophisticated trading strategy based on a structural 
model known as the CreditGrades model, see Finger et al. (2002). This is done based on a 
dataset consisting of daily CDS and equity prices for 67 non-financial European corporations 
covering the period between 2007 and 2015. Our main objective is to check if our strategy is 




This thesis is structured in the following way; Section 2 reviews the existing literature 
on structural models and their performance within capital structure arbitrage. Section 3 presents 
the CreditGrades model by Finger et al. (2002) and several posterior extensions to the original 
model. Section 4 reviews the dataset used in this thesis. Section 5 explains the trading strategy 
used. Section 6 discusses the empirical results of the structural model and the trading strategy. 





2. Literature Review 
 
This section reviews the literature on structural models of corporate liabilities. First, the 
existing literature on structural models of contingent liabilities is reviewed. Due to their 
importance in the literature the papers by Merton (1974), Black and Cox (1976) and Zhou 
(2001) will be described in more detail. The CreditGrades model by Finger et al. (2002) is 
covered in section 3. The second part of this section reviews the literature regarding the 
theoretical fundaments behind capital structure arbitrage strategies as well as the 
implementation and the ability to generate excess returns of such strategies. As capital structure 
arbitrage is a complex undertaking involving different models, parameters and methods of 
calibration, all applied in different time spans, conclusions vary widely in literature. 
 
2.1. Literature on Structural Models of corporate 
liabilities 
 
At the foundation of structural models of corporate liabilities lies the model developed 
by Merton (1974). In this model it is assumed that a given corporation has only one single zero 
coupon bond outstanding. When the bond matures the firm is assumed to be liquidated. If assets 
are worth more than liabilities debtholders are paid fully and equity holders receive the residual. 
If they are worth less, the firm is said to default. In this case debtholders take all assets from the 
firm to compensate for their loss. Equity holders receive 0. Under this setting, the value of the 
equity can be modelled in the same way as the value of a European call. Similarly the debtholder 
position is equivalent to holding a risk free debt security and shorting a put option on the firm 
value. Assuming a flat term structure of interest rates, a Modigliani – Miller set – up, perfect 
markets and a firm value, which can be described as in equation (1), one can calculate the prices 
for debt and equity as shown in equations (3) and (4). 
𝑑𝐴 = (𝛼𝐴 − 𝐶)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐴𝑑𝑧       (1) 
where A denotes the value of the assets/firm, 𝛼 denotes the instantaneous growth rate of the 
assets, C denotes cash pay-outs such as dividends and  z is a standard Wiener process. r 
expresses the risk free rate, 𝜏 the time to maturity of the zero coupon bond, B the face value of 
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The value of the firm is then given by       
 𝐴 =  𝐸(𝐴, 𝜏) + 𝐷(𝐴, 𝜏)           (3) 
The spread of a bond can be easily computed from its bond price just rearranging equation 
(4).  
𝐷[𝐴, 𝜏] = exp[−𝑦(𝜏)𝜏] 𝐵        (4) 
Solving for y and taking out the risk free rate one obtains the model spread 
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Unfortunately, empirical studies have shown that Merton model does not comply with 
real world observations. Especially, its inability to generate short-term default probabilities, and 
therefore credit spreads, which are compliant with empirical findings, prohibits practitioners 
from using the Merton model. The root of this problem lies in the assumption of the geometric 
Brownian motion. The variance of the firm value is, as shown in Merton (1974), a convex 
function of time, which results in a low variance for short maturities. For companies whose 
value is well above the default point (investment grade) this produces default probabilities close 
to zero as 𝜏 approaches 0. For companies that are close or even beneath the default point (high 




 One practical way to work around the problem of low short term spreads was undertaken 
by Moody’s KMV.2 In their model, the idea is to first calculate a measure, which they called 
distance to default, that resembles how far the market value of assets is from a certain default 
point. Their measure can be computed simply as 
𝐷𝐷 =  
𝑙𝑛(𝐴0)−𝑙𝑛 (𝑋)
𝜎𝐴
         (6) 
Where 𝐴0 denotes the value of the assets in time 0, X denotes the default point and 𝜎𝐴 
denotes the asset volatility. From this equation (6) one can easily observe that the distance to 
default is basically a count of standard deviations from the asset value until the default point.  
Using the default point one can easily calculate the probability of default: 
𝑃𝐷 =  𝜙[−𝐷𝐷]          (7) 
At this point, instead of evaluating the distance to default on the Normal distribution, Moody’s 
extensive database is used to map the calculated distances to defaults to empirical default 
probabilities. For example, using the basic Black & Scholes Merton set – up a distance to default 
of 4 would give a default probability of 0,003%. Using Moody’s KMV mapping procedure 
would give one a default probability of 0.4%, see Sun et al. (2012). Unlike other models, the 
aim of Moody’s KMV model is not to calculate the value of corporate debt but to quantify the 
default probabilities of a given debtor. While Moody’s KMV model produces higher default 
probabilities for short-term maturity investment grade bonds, it is academically speaking not 
coherent as it mingles normally distributed default distances with empirical default 
probabilities.  
One of the largest issues in the Black Scholes set-up and therefore the Merton model is 
the assumption of normally distributed returns. There are very few all-equity firms outstanding. 
Notwithstanding this, there is enough empirical evidence that market returns tend to be 
leptokurtic meaning that they have a higher peak around its mean and a higher kurtosis (heavy 
tails) than the normal distribution. In addition, they tend to have a left skew. With their 
proprietary database, Moody’s is able to circumvent also this problem.  
 Other crucial assumption in Merton’s model is the idea that firms have only one zero 
coupon bond outstanding and that the firm is simply liquidated when this bond matures. As 
pointed by Black and Cox (1976), in the real world, firms issue several bonds with different 
                                                          
2 Moody’s KMV model has had several improvements. According to Sun et al. (2012), the model currently used 




maturities. In addition, bonds frequently have associated covenants in order to protect 
bondholders. Notice that modelling equity as a plain vanilla European call on the firm´s assets, 
Merton’s model comprises some perverse incentives to shareholders. As classic option’s 
pricing theory teaches, the value of any long position in options is a monotonically increasing 
function of volatility (positive Vega). The consequence of this is that equity holders just have 
to increase asset return volatility (i.e. take further risk) to increase the value of their claim. This 
is especially relevant whenever a firm is in financial trouble. In this case, management and 
equity holders might take irrational risks in order to attempt a kind of Hail Mary pass to safe 
their own positions. This phenomenon is known in the literature as gambling for resurrection. 
Debt holders usually have two preferred methodologies to prohibit management and equity 
holders from gambling for resurrection. One possibility is to introduce some kind of covenants 
in the debt contracts. Another way is lending money only for short periods. Whenever equity 
holders actions’ are perceived as too risky, debt holders simply “pull the plug” and not roll over 
their debt. Here the roll over dates act like check points, for debt holders to assess conditions 
again.  
In order to solve this issue, Black and Cox (1976) propose the use of first passage time 
models. The model has the same assumptions about perfect markets as the Merton model. 
However, it models the equity of a firm as a down and out call option. Once the value of the 
firm falls below a specific threshold, the equity becomes worthless. Differently from Merton 
(1974) default can happen at any point in time and not just at debt’s maturity. As a result, 
shareholders position is no more monotonic on volatility meaning that shareholders incentives 
to gamble are now much lower.  
The introduction of the barrier has also impact in terms of debt holders expected loss. 
Notice that this barrier establishes a lower boundary for the value of debt holders recovery. In 
absence of bankruptcy costs, the value of debt is a monotonically increasing function of this 
barrier. In the case where there are no default costs and the barrier is assumed to equal firm’s 
liabilities, debt holders expected loss is simply 0. In contrast, equity value is simply a 
monotonically decreasing function of this barrier. Without this mechanism, the value of firm 
could literally fall to zero without the debt holders being able to intervene.  
Another crucial assumption in the Merton (1974) model is the idea that interest rates are 
constant. In an important paper, Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) propose a model where, in 
addition to a constant barrier, interest rates are considered to be stochastic according to the 




relax the assumption of a constant risk free rate (see for example Ramaswamy, Sundaresan 
(1986) and Maloney (1992)). Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) were, however, the first ones to 
find a closed form solution for a first passage in time model, incorporating dynamic interest 
rates. In addition, this model allows for complex capital structures and deviations from the 
absolute priority rule. The latter states that senior debt holders have to be repaid in full before 
junior debt and then equity holders can be repaid. In reality, however, the absolute priority rule 
hardly holds as for a restructuring all debt and equity holders have to approve. [Fabozzi (2002)] 
The use of stochastic interest rates is very important in pricing bonds, as the risk free 
rate is part of the discount factor for the principal and interest cash flows. However, in the case 
of CDS contracts the risk free rate enters the calculation mainly to discount the coupon 
payments and the CDS compensation in case of default.. These cash flows are rather small 
compared to the interest and principle payments of a bond. For this reason, the discount rate 
affects CDS prices to a lesser extent than it affects bond prices. In addition, as there is only a 
slightly negative empirical relationship between interest rates and credit spreads, one can 
assume interest rates are not an integral determinant of default probabilities (see Longstaff, 
Schwartz (1995) and Joon et al. (1993)). According to Lando (2004), if and only if the risk free 
rate is very volatile it has significant effect on CDS prices and thus the assumption of constant 
risk free rate is not problematic in most cases.  
 Unfortunately, both Black and Cox (1976) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) models 
fail to generate short-term spreads that are compliant with empirical findings. As previously 
referred, Moody’s KMV model found a practical way to solve this issue. As also referred, while 
their approach is very simple and effective, it is theoretically not correct. Nevertheless, other 
methods to achieve non-normal distributed default probabilities which are theoretical more 
consistent have been developed over the recent years. The most popular assume that assets 
follow some type of jump diffusion process. This is the case of Zhou (2001), He et al. (2011) 
and Ozeki et al. (2011). Escobar et al. (2012) assume that asset volatility is not constant3. Both 
cases lead to non-normal distributions. When jumps are introduced, the default becomes an 
unpredictable mathematical event, meaning that no one knows if the firm may default exactly 
in the next instant in time. This is in deep contrast with diffusion models for which default is 
said to be a predictable event. In the case of Zhou (2011), the dynamics of a firm asset value 
are described by the following equation (8): 
                                                          
3 Stochastic volatility models are able to generate tails. Nevertheless, as time to maturity reaches 0 the spread 






= (𝜇 − 𝜆𝑣)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑍1 + (Π − 1)𝑑𝑌      (8) 
where  
𝜇 denotes the expected return on the firm’s assets 
𝑣, 𝜆 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎 denote positive constants 
𝑍1 is a standard Brownian motion 
dY is Poisson process with an intensity parameter 𝜆 
𝛱 is the jump amplitude which must fulfil  𝛱 > 0 and has the expected value v+1 
 While the normal diffusion process resembles the normal “noise” around a firm’s value 
the jump process models sudden and large moves in the firm’s value. The latter can be due to 
public knowledge of new important information about the firm, e.g. fines, takeover attempts 
and much more. The value of the firm moves randomly and can drop at any time beneath the 
specified threshold without being exactly equal to it. The probability of the firm suddenly 
defaulting will depend on the hazard jump rate and on the volatility of the jump process. Also 
notice that, similarly to Merton (1974), but different from Black and Cox (1976), the recovery 
rate received by debt holders is stochastic meaning that debt holders do not know how much 
they receive in case of default. Given the nature of the jump process, there is however no closed 
form solution for this problem. The bond has thus to be priced using a Monte Carlo simulation 
approach. 
2.2.  Capital Structure Arbitrage 
 
Structural models of corporate liabilities treat equity and debt as two different claims 
contingent on the same underlying: the market value of the firm assets. The market value of 
assets is however unobservable and the maximum we can do is to estimate it based on the prices 
of all other claims. Based on this, one can then re-estimate what should be the correct price for 
these claims. Whenever divergences from the theoretical prices occur, the law of one price is 
violated, conditional on the model used. Such divergences from equilibrium prices can occur 
for a number of different reasons. Three reasons are commonly referred in the literature. First, 
it is usually stated that investors specialized in different asset classes may have different 
opinions about what is going on. This leads to different dynamics in different asset classes. 




very liquid and transparent and therefore able to incorporate new information much faster than 
debt markets. Norden and Weber (2004) compare the speed of price discovery in equity, CDS 
and bond markets and conclude in favour of this theory. Considering daily and weekly lead – 
lag relationships for their sample from 2000 to 2002 they find stock markets returns lead CDS 
and bond spread changes. This lead – lag relationship for stock market returns and CDS spreads 
does depend on the credit quality of the underlying corporation. For low quality credit firms 
this relationship is stronger. Finally, another explanation usually referred is related with the 
procedures involving the different types of investments. For instance, the downgrading of any 
bond shall lead to a big sell-off, as institutional investors may not be allowed to hold high yield 
bonds. Equity investors however are not required to fulfil any regulation of this type.   
Some authors such as Duarte et al. (2007) suggest however that following the wide 
spread use of CDS contracts, the fundamentals behind capital structure arbitrage have most 
likely decreased. As standardized CDS contracts are more liquid than the underlying bonds, 
debt markets are now able to process information faster and therefore reach the equilibrium 
price in a timely manner. Even though the two markets have probably became more 
interconnected, existing literature still gives reason to believe that capital structure arbitrage is 
still able to lead to unexplained excess returns, due to inefficiencies in either debt and/or equity 
markets. 
In addition, new regulations in the US, Great Britain and the EU prohibiting banks of 
being active in proprietary trading, and thus making market making less profitable, is expected 
to contribute to a slower process of price discovery in bond markets. Compared with equity 
markets, corporate debt markets are very fragmented and shallow. This fragmentation makes 
the presence of dealers mandatory to provide liquidity. When dealers have less capacity to buy 
and sell bonds, diminishing liquidity in the market, bid – ask spreads tend to increase. In 
extreme cases, such as a sudden spike in yields, the market experiences a big selling pressure, 
but as there is only limited buying power by dealers this will push prices further down. On the 
other hand, whenever the better part of investors wants to buy but there are simply not enough 
bonds available at dealers, this shall increase prices. One can easily see this would lead to a 
higher volatility in bond markets. Since the higher volatility is caused by bond market 
specificities, the effect on equity markets should be minor. There are at least two favourable 
scenarios for arbitrageurs. If movements in bond spread cause similar movements in the CDS 




capital structure arbitrageurs. If however, the movements in the bond market do not affect the 
CDS market, this would generate opportunities for CDS – bond basis arbitrageurs.4 
Structural models assume that equity and CDS spreads are related through some 
function that varies among models. All of them have in common the idea that whenever assets 
go up, equity value should go up and CDS spreads should go down by certain amounts (and 
vice-versa). These amounts differ however from model to model. Assuming that the asset value 
is the only stochastic variable in the model, this implies that equity and CDS spreads are 
negatively related. In order for capital structure arbitrage to work, and though there might be 
some temporary perturbations, we hope that the true data generating process is consistent with 
this. In addition, we hope that our model is able to approximate the true relationship between 
CDS spreads and equity. Correctly approximating the relationship between CDS spreads and 
equity prices is crucial in capital structure arbitrage as it is used to determine the appropriate 
hedge ratio. If the model employed is not a good approximation of the true data generating 
process, one will not only receive subpar trading triggers, but also the hedge ratio will be 
imprecisely estimated, leading to an underestimation of the risk level incurred. 
Figure 1: Relationship between CDS Spreads and Equity Prices in the CreditGrades model.. For this 
sensitivy analysis all other input parameters such as volatility, debt per share ratio, the risk free rate,time 
to maturity, recovery rates and the volatility of the default barier have been held constant. 
As can be seen in Figure 1, our model does not imply a linear relationship between 
equity prices and CDS spreads. The first derivative of our function is always negative but it 
converges to 0 as equity increases. This makes sense as for high equity prices default 
                                                          
4 The CDS – Bond basis refers to the difference in spreads a bond and a CDS contract on the same obligor have. 
Theoretical the difference should be very small, only compensating interest rate risk in bonds. Otherwise it would 
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probabilities are already close to zero and thus debt holders do not gain as much from a further 
increase.  
Though structural models point to a clear negative relation equity value and CDS 
spreads, empirical evidence on this fact in capital structural arbitrage literature has been weak. 
Different authors suggest various correlation of debt and equity markets. For instance, Currie 
and Morris (2002) state that correlations between equities and debt of the same company are 
between 5% and 15%. One should be however very careful when we test whether equity 
markets and CDS markets are in fact related. The use of linear correlation measures as Pearson 
correlation might be misleading as the relation between equity and CDS spreads should be 
highly non-linear as structural models suggest. Rank correlation measures such as Spearman 
rho or Kendall’s tau should be more appropriate in these cases. Unfortunately, the authors do 
not state whether they calculated the Pearson correlation coefficient or a rank correlation 
coefficient.5 The low correlations could also be explained by the lead – lag relationship 
described by Norden and Weber (2004). For a more thorough examination, one could form 
portfolios using weekly or even monthly returns to minimize the effect of the lead – lag 
relationship on correlations6. 
 Previous paragraphs discussed the foundations of capital structure arbitrage. This study 
will now revise the literature on its performance. As capital structure arbitrage is a complex 
undertaking involving different models, parameters and methods of calibration, all applied in 
different time spans, conclusions vary widely in literature. 
Yu (2005) examines the risk – return properties of capital structure arbitrage using the 
CreditGrades model. Daily CDS spreads of 33 companies between 1997 and 2004 are analysed. 
The implemented trading strategy accounts for trading costs by using a bid – ask spread for 
CDS of 18%. The use of data from a period where the CDS market was not as liquid as it is 
today motivated Yu (2005) to use this high bid – ask spread. Yu (2005) concludes that capital 
structure arbitrage is able to generate significant excess returns, though he finds the strategy 
risky. This finding suggests the name capital structure arbitrage is misleading. Especially in the 
case where the trigger signalling that the market is being inconsistent is set at a low level, Yu 
(2005) finds a high standard deviation in holding returns and at times a negative mean of such 
                                                          
5 For our dataset the average Pearson correlation coefficient is -0,21 while the average rank correlation 
coefficient is -0,25. A detailed description of the dataset will follow in section 4. 
6 In appendix H one finds the average rank correlation coefficient for daily, weekly and monthly changes in 




returns. 7 As stated in the paper, the high losses come mostly from shorting CDS contracts. 
Shorting CDS contracts is very risky as the non-linearities in the CDS-equity relation turn the 
hedge position (i.e. shorting stock) ineffective. One could simply not execute trades where one 
has to short CDS contracts. This would reduce considerably the number of possibilities to do 
capital structure arbitrage, though8. As an alternative, one can update the hedge ratio more 
frequently or simply over hedge such trades by shorting a larger amount of stock. Despite the 
riskiness of the strategy, Yu (2005) recognizes that capital structure arbitrage is very capable 
of producing very attractive returns. In its most promising set – up Yu (2005) is able to produce 
average monthly excess return of 10% and an annualized Shape ratio of 1.54. One should be 
however critical of Yu (2005) results as his data set is composed of only 33 obligors and his 
most promising set – up was obtained in an in – sample exercise.  
Duarte et al. (2007) present a completely different picture. In their study, they compare 
different fixed income arbitrage strategies. Among these strategies, they implement a simple 
version of capital structure arbitrage using the CreditGrades model. They do it for 261 obligors 
covering the period between 2001 and 2004. A 5% bid – ask spread for CDS is assumed but 
equity specific trading costs are not considered. Duarte et al. (2007) approximate fees using the 
hedge fund standard 2% and 20% model in addition to the transactions costs10. Three of the six 
strategies published by Duarte et. al. (2007) have positive monthly excess returns that are 
significant at the 5% level. In addition, in contrast with Yu (2005), Duarte et al. (2007) conclude 
that all six capital structure arbitrage strategies have a positive skewness and excess kurtosis. 
Running regressions on common risk factors, their capital structure arbitrage strategy is able to 
produce positive alphas, before and after fees. However, after fees only the strategy with the 
highest trigger in the speculative bond universe produces an alpha of 0.680%, which is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. Obviously, there is a trade – off between the 
engagement in trades and the risk of the strategy. One could simply engage in any trade 
whenever the model detects a minor mispricing in the hope of future convergence. This could 
lead however to higher trading costs and more risk. Duarte et al. (2007) test different strategies 
with different entering triggers for speculative and investment grade obligors. Unfortunately, 
their numbers are not comparable with ours since we use a different calibration procedure. 
                                                          
7 The triggers are a measurement of the divergence between model and market spreads. For a larger trigger 
the divergence between both spreads needs to be larger in order to enter a trade. 
8 See appendix E. 
10 Investors typically pay 2% of their assets as an annual fee. On top of that a 20% performance is usually 





Cserna and Imbierowicz (2008) find results similar to those from Duarte et al (2007). 
They find that for their sample period from 2002 to 2006 the CDS market was inefficient with 
capital structure arbitrage being able to generate positive excess returns. Their sample consisted 
out of 808 obligors, which is much larger than Yu (2005) and Duarte et al (2007). The standard 
5% bid – ask spread for CDS was used. In addition, a 0.1% bid – ask spread for stocks was 
considered. Contrarily to previous papers that focused on the CreditGrades model, this study 
does a comparison between different structural models. In their study, the CreditGrades model 
was able to produce Sharpe ratio of 0.77 for the time period between 2002 and 2006 with a 
clear negative trend over the years. The Zhou (2001) and Leland and Toft (1996) models were 
however able to outperform the CreditGrades model both with a Sharpe ratio of 0.79. They also 
conclude that the efficiency of CDS markets has increased over the later period of their sample 
as excess returns have been decreasing. As most studies, Cserna and Imbierwociz (2008) find 
capital structure arbitrage is most lucrative for low credit quality firms.  
A very recent study by Wojtowicz’s (2014) implements the CreditGrades model and 
using a sample covering the period between 2010 and 2012. He finds nearly 60% of the trades 
end in convergence with trading possibilities clustering in time, though.12 The mean holding 
return of this trades after transactions costs is 6.59% and the maximum loss registered by their 
strategy was substantially below 5%. Notice however that Wojtowicz’s (2014) considers a very 
short time frame. As the strategy  implemented in this study is very similar to the one followed 
by Wojtowicz’s (2014), a closer examination of the methodology will follow in section 3.  
  
                                                          




3. The CreditGrades model 
  
As previously said, several approaches have been proposed in order to solve the fact that first 
generation structural models were unable to generate sufficiently high credit spreads for short-
term investment grade bonds. We have already discussed two alternatives, notably, the practical 
oriented approach followed by Moody’s KMV, which relies on an extensive proprietary 
database, and the more theoretical consistent proposal of Zhou (2001), who considers that assets 
follow a jump-diffusion process. In this section, a third alternative is considered: the 
CreditGrades model. 
The CreditGrades is a quantitative single-name credit risk model developed by 
RiskMetrics Group, Inc. together with Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank. As 
pointed by Currie and Morris (2002) and Yu (2006), the CreditGrades model soon became the 
standard industry model for measuring credit spreads.. The technical details of this model are 
presented in Finger et al. (2002). While the authors were very well aware of the problems of 
diffusion processes in modelling short-term credit spreads, the CreditGrades model avoided the 
introduction of jumps. Instead, an uncertain default barrier is introduced. As discussed in this 
section, the introduction of uncertainty in the barrier turns default into an unpredictable event. 
This enables the model to produce higher short-term spreads even for investment grade bonds. 
The fact that the model still relies on the classic geometric Brownian motion allowed its authors 
to find a closed form solution for CDS spreads13. This is a great advantage in comparison to the 
more complex jump-diffusion models.  
The CreditGrades model assumes that the firm value follows a geometric Brownian 
motion. Therefore, changes in the firm value follow equation (9): 
𝑑𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑡
=  𝜇𝐴𝑑𝑡 +  𝜎𝑑𝑊𝑡         (9) 
where W defines a standard Brownian motion,  𝜎 denotes the asset volatility and 𝜇𝐴 the asset 
drift. It is assumed that the company issues continuously new debt at a pace equal to the risk 
free rate. This implies that under the risk neutral measure nominal debt has the same drift as the 
                                                          
13 The closed form solution in Finger et al (2002) only approximates the correct survival probability. The correct 





market value of assets. In relative terms, the drift of the assets to the default barrier (debt) is 
zero, and thus the leverage ratio is expected to remain constant in the risk neutral measure.  
Using the CreditGrades model the default barrier (L), follows a lognormal distribution 
with expected value ?̅?, and variance 𝜆2. Notice that this does not mean that the barrier is a 
stochastic process, e.g. the barrier does not change over time. However, the exact value of the 
default barrier is unknown prior to default, (see Figure 2). The default barrier can computed 
using the following equation (10): 
𝐿𝐷 =  ?̅?𝐷𝑒𝜆𝑍−𝜆
2/2         (10) 
where: 
?̅? = 𝐸(𝐿) 
𝜆2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐿) 
Z is said to be a standard normal random variable, which is independent of the Brownian 
motion W. According to the Portfolio Management Data and Standard & Poor’s database ?̅? 
should take the value of 0.5 and 𝜆 of 0.3 [Hu and Lawrence (2000)].14 D denotes the value of 
debt per share.  
Please note for a higher 𝜆2 the default barrier may take larger values and therefore 
increases the risk of a default 
                                                          
14 For the financial sector 𝜆 should take a lower value due to specific government regulation. [Finger et al. 





Figure 2 Description of CreditGrades model, Source: Finger et al.( 2002) 
 
 In order to implement the CreditGrades model, one has to estimate various input 
parameters. Regarding D, which is the debt-per-share, the following steps should be pursued. 
First, one has to calculate the financial debt of any given firm, which is equal to: 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 = 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 +
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 0,5(𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠 +
𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠)        (11) 
where other liabilities refer to liabilities such as tax liabilities and pension liabilities. 
In a second step, one has to adjust for minority debt. This is done subtracting Minority debt, 
which is nevertheless capped at 50% of the Financial Debt. 
Debt = Financial debt – Minority debt       (12) 
In a third step, one has to calculate the Number of shares. This is done by adding up the number 
of Common shares and the number of Preferred shares where 
Common shares = Market cap / Stock price and 
Preferred shares = Preferred equity / Stock price      (13) 
Finally, Debt per share equals to  




 As with all diffusion processes, its path largely depends on its volatility. In opposition 
to the Black Scholes case, the underlying asset cannot be observed in the market, turning 
volatility estimation more difficult. Finding a good estimator for the asset volatility is key in 
implementing this model. One possibility proposed in Finger et al. (2002) is to use a 1000 day 
historic average of the equity volatility as an input factor for the asset volatility calculation. 
Following the application of Ito’s lemma, it is possible to show that asset and equity volatility 






           (15) 
S denotes the stock price for a given firm and 𝜎𝑆 denotes the equity volatility.  
Following equation (15) and assuming that A = S + LD, and thus the derivative of A 





          (16) 
According to equation (16), equity volatility is rising giving a fall in stock prices and a 
constant asset volatility. This is in line with empirical findings that companies closer to default 
tend to show higher equity volatility. This relationship is commonly referred to as the leverage 
effect. 
Now as all input parameters have been discussed one can compute the survival 
probability by the following equation (17). Based on Finger et al. (2002), the survival 
probability is given by 












)     (17) 












𝑡 + 𝜆²         (19) 
where  
𝑆0 = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 





∗ = 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
D = debt per share 
?̅? = global debt recovery rate 
𝜆 = percentage standard deviation of the default barrier 
 
The survival probability function is then used to compute CDS spreads as followed: 
𝑐∗ = 𝑟 (1 − 𝑅)
1−𝑃(0)+𝑒𝑟𝜉(𝐺(𝑡+𝜉)−𝐺(𝜉))
𝑃(0)−𝑃(𝑡)𝑒−𝑟𝑡−𝑒𝑟𝜉(𝐺(𝑡+𝜉)−𝐺(𝜉))
     (20) 
where 𝜉 = 𝜆
2
𝜎2
, and G is given by Rubinstein and Reiner (1991): 
𝐺(𝑡) =  𝑑𝑧+0,5𝜙 (−
log(𝑑)
𝜎√𝑡











R denotes the asset specific recovery rate while r denotes the risk free rate. In the CreditGrades 
technical document R is set to 0.3. As R is used to estimate the recovery rate of unsecured debt 
is must be smaller than ?̅?  the global recovery rate, which accounts for unsecured and secured 
debt.  
In 2008, Kiesel and Veraart (2008) pointed out that the formula for calculating the 
survival probability used by Finger et al. (2002) was wrong. They argue that it is only an 
approximation, which in cases of high leverage, can lead to substantially different survival 
probabilities and therefore CDS spreads.15 Kiesel and Veraart (2008) state that the correct 
equation (21) to calculate the survival probability is: 






























)           (21) 
                                                          
15 Kiesel and Veraart (2008) show that whenever the share-to-debt ratio is below 0.796, the 





Over the years there have been various extensions of the CreditGrades model. Stamicar 
and Finger (2006) proposed incorporating equity derivatives into the CreditGrades model in 
three different ways:  
1. Estimating asset volatility by ATM options, but leaving all other input parameters as in 
the previous version. 
2. Estimating asset volatility by ATM options and estimating leverage using CDS 
contracts. 
3. Estimating asset volatility and leverage by using two different options. 
The rationale behind their extension is obvious when one acknowledges that option 
implied volatilities are forward looking. Especially the 1000-day historical average used by 
Finger et al (2002) seems to be critical as it doesn’t respond quick enough to an increase in 
volatility following a deterioration in credit quality. Estimating leverage from market data can 
be useful for trading strategies when balance sheet data is not made available entirely or is not 
accurate enough, due to large holding of secured debt.  
 
One alternative to the above-mentioned approaches is to use CDS implied volatilities as 
proposed by Wojtowicz (2014). Wojtowicz (2014) calculates the implied asset volatility using 
existing market CDS spreads. Then the model CDS spreads are computed by using a one-year 
average of the daily CDS implied volatility. This strategy guarantees that market and model 
prices are never too far from each other avoiding an abnormal number of trades for some issuers. 
In addition, under this approach the model is constantly recalibrated This contrasts with Yu 
(2005) where the model is calibrated once using a 10-day burn in period. In this article, the 







The data set used in this article consists of 67 non financial corporations from the Euro 
area. For these companies we have downloaded daily equity prices and CDS spreads from 
14.12.2007 to 31.12.2015 from Thomson Reuters. The 5 year risk free interest rate, which is 
approximated by the ISDA fixed middle rate, was also taken for the same time period. The 
initial dataset used in this study was comprised of 97 corporations. Nevertheless, we have 
excluded companies, whose CDS contracts were not regarded as being liquid. In order to 
identify these companies we have checked for the first 250 days if there has been a consecutive 
period of 30 days where no trading activity has taken place. If this was the case, we excluded 
this company from our sample. Such a screening is important as for illiquid contracts, the 
assumption of being a price taker may not hold.  
As shown in Table 1 our dataset comprises firms from a great number of economic sectors. 
‘Consumer Discretionary’ and ‘Industrials’ are the sectors with the highest weight.  
 
Table 1: Sector Breakdown of the examined company. Financial corporations were not 
considered, as estimating their appropriate debt per share ratio is not as straight forward 
as for non-financial corporations 
 
In Figure 2, the current rating breakdown of the companies examined in this study can 
be observed. Investment Grade corporations correspond to 82.09% (55 companies) while 
companies within the high yield space  total only 7.46% (5 companies). Not Rated companies 
account for 10.45% (7 companies) of the sample. Our sample is very concentrated in the 
Investment Grade space. This is partly the result of our filtering process, which resulted in a 
great number of non-investment grade firms being eliminated from our data set.  
 
Sector # of companies percentage
Energy 4 6%
Information Technology 2 4%
Consumer Staples 6 9%
Health Care 2 4%
Consumer Discretionary 15 21%
Materials 8 15%








Figure 3 Current rating breakdown (S&P Ratings) of all examined corporations 
As mentioned in section 3, the existence of a significant level of correlation between 
CDS spreads and equity prices is crucial for capital structure arbitrage to be a successful 
strategy. In Table 2, one can find the rank correlation coefficient for the dataset.16 In panel A, 
one finds the rank correlation coefficient for three different sub periods. The first period ranges 
from 2007 to 2011 and includes the financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. The 
second period, which comprises the years from 2012 to 2015, was marked by very low interest 
rates and the implementation of aggressive quantitative easing programs in the euro area. In 
panel B one finds correlations split by Investment Grade, High Yield and Not Rated obligors.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of correlation between changes in equity prices and changes in CDS spreads 
 
From Table 2 one can see that correlations between equity prices and CDS spreads are 
more significant than the figures referenced by Currie and Morris (2002) and Yu (2005), which 
                                                          
16 Only the rank correlation is presented in this study as the relationship between CDS spreads and equity prices 
is assumed to be non-linear. However, for the case of daily returns, we found the Pearson correlation to be quite 
close to the rank correlation coefficient. 
2009 - 2011 2012 -2015
Average -25.54% -25.08%
Stanard Deviation 9.31% 11.15%
High Yield Not Rated
Average -26.10% -32.04% -15.44%
Investment Grade
Panel B




Rank Correlation changes in CDS Spreads and Equity Prices
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tend to be close to 0,20 in absolute value. For our sample, correlations have appeared to be very 
stable over time. Unsurprisingly correlations for high yield corporations are more significant 
than for investment grade or not rated obligors. This is in line with the findings in previous 
studies pointing that equity and CDS markets tend to be more interconnected when firms are 





5. Trading Strategy 
 
The trading strategy implemented in this thesis is based on the CreditGrades model. 
Whenever there is a large enough divergence between market and model CDS spreads, it is 
assumed that there is some type of mispricing in either the CDS or the equity market. CDS 
spreads and/or equity prices should thus eventually converge to the ones estimated by our 
model. The market is considered not to be consistent with the model whenever one of the 
following occurs for a 5 year CDS contract: 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 > 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 +  (𝑑𝑐̅̅ ̅ + 𝑎 ∗ 𝜎𝑑) 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 <  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 − (𝑑𝑐̅̅ ̅ + 𝑎 ∗ 𝜎𝑑)  
where 𝑑𝑐̅̅ ̅ denotes the moving average for the previous c days of the absolute difference 
between the market and the model CDS spreads, 𝜎𝑑 is the standard deviation of the differences 
over the specific period and, finally, 𝑎 and c are parameters which have to be estimated. The 
parameters used in this study are 4 for 𝑎 and 20 days for c. This set of parameters was found by 
optimizing the Sharpe Ratio across the whole sample17. This procedure presents two advantages 
over the static approaches normally used in existing literature. First, by using a moving average 
and a standard deviation measure, we are able to customize trading signals to the time series 
properties of each company. In contrast, other procedures described in the literature, which use 
the same parameters for all companies, require market spreads to deviate a lot more from model 
spreads in absolute terms in the case of riskier firms. This creates a kind of bias with trading 
signals tending to be more frequent than the optimal level in the case of safer firms. The 
opposite occurs in the case of riskier firms. Secondly, the thresholds used in most studies are 
static meaning that they do not change over time and thus are not able to adjust when the 
surrounding environment changes, e.g. a faster price discovery process in the debt market may 
lead to a reduction in the average difference between model and market CDS spreads. In 
contrast, our threshold values change through time. 
Similar to Wojtowicz (2014) we assume that convergence has occurred whenever the 
model and the market spreads trade within a 1% interval. The fact that the probability of further 
convergence being in principle positively related with the divergence size indicates that there 
should be scope for capital structure arbitrageurs to optimize also on the exit threshold. 
                                                          
17 In appendix A we present a parameter sweep, which shows the Sharpe Ratio for 400 different combinations 




Nevertheless, the fact that we restrict the holding period to 180 days mitigates the impact of 
this.18 
 In order to implement our strategy, our sample of 67 companies was divided into 67 
portfolios each of which consisting of one single company. In the beginning of the period, an 
equal amount of capital was assigned to each portfolio. As previously referred, under our 
strategy a trade is entered whenever the market and model CDS spreads are considered to be 
too far away from each other. Two cases may occur. We may have either a short position on 
the CDS market (short position on stocks) or a long position on the CDS market (long position 
on stocks). There are, however, some important issues one must take into account in the case 
of shorting CDS contracts. In particular, no one wants insurance from someone that is not 
trustworthy. The investor who buys the protection wants to be sure that the protection seller has 
enough funds to honour the contract in times of default. Whenever this is not assured, there 
might be reasons for a counterparty premium in the CDS contract, which may undermine our 
strategy. A credible risk management system is therefore particularly important whenever 
holding short positions on CDS contracts. This should involve measuring the credit value-at-
risk of our portfolio at each moment in time. Alternatively, one could simply avoid entering 
into trades that involve shorting CDS contracts19. In this study, and though no effective risk 
management tool was considered, both short and long positions were considered. Nevertheless, 
the relationship between the notional of the CDS and the initial capital, which we called 
leverage, was restricted to 5, meaning that  one could trade a CDS contract with a notional of 5 
million Euros with initial capital of only 1 million euros. In addition, a stop loss mechanism has 
been implemented. The latter implies that, whenever the value of the security portfolio has 
dropped by 50% or more of its maximal value, we are forced to liquidate the position.  
 In order to evaluate our strategy, we need to estimate the value of our portfolio at each 
moment in time. This correspond to the sum of all outstanding CDS contract values, equity 
investments and of our current cash position. It is trivial to estimate the daily returns of the 
equity leg of our strategy. In order to construct the daily returns of the CDS portfolio, as there 
is no liquid secondary market for such contracts in all maturities, one needs however to calculate 
the daily theoretical values of these contracts. A newly issued CDS contract is worth 0 at its 
issuance as the initial spread ensures both legs, the one paid by the buyer (coupon leg) and the 
                                                          
18 Notice, however, that whenever a firm is still within the limits of our entrance thresholds, and though we close 
our position after 180 days, a new position is created in the next day. So, this rule is only effective for the cases 
where some convergence has occurred but not enough to reach our exit threshold.  
19 In the appendix, one can find return statistics on a strategy where shorting CDS is prohibited. Results are very 




one received by the buyer (default leg) are exactly worth the same. Over time markets appraisal 
on global and firms conditions change and the negotiated spread is no longer ensuring an 
equilibrium price of 0. For instance, when default probabilities rise the CDS contract has a 
positive value to the protection buyer (and a negative one of to the seller). However, when 
default probabilities decrease, the CDS contract has a negative value to the buyer and a positive 
value to the seller. Computing the value of an existing CDS contract is important; as we have 
to take into account the cash flow of selling such a contract after convergence has occurred. In 
this study, we do it following Yu (2005), who states that a long position in a CDS contract is 
worth 
𝑉(𝑡, 𝑇) = (𝑐(𝑡, 𝑇) − 𝑐(0, 𝑇)) ∫ 𝑃(𝑡, 𝑠)𝑞𝑡(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑇
𝑡
     (22) 
where c(t,T) is the current spread of an existing CDS contract, c(0,T) is the spread of the CDS 
contract when it was negotiated first and 𝑞𝑡denotes the survival probability from time t until 
maturity in T. P(t,s) denotes the price of a discount bond. The survival probability is computed 
using the CreditGrades model. Notice that the valuation of the CDS contract depends mostly 
on the spread change and only to a lesser extent on the survival probability, which is model 
based. Using this equation to value our CDS position one needs secondary market quotes on 
any given day for a CDS contract with the specific residual maturity. As this data is not available 
Yu (2005) approximates c(t,T) by c(t,T+t), where the latter corresponds to the CDS spread on 
a newly issued CDS contract with the same maturity as the initial CDS contract. One alternative 
to this would be simply to do some type of interpolation based on the observed CDS curve. 
Nonetheless, Yu (2005) argues that the holding period t is usually very small in relation to the 
maturity and thus this approximation should lead to good results. Since we are using only 5 
year contracts, which are the most liquid, and we do not allow holding periods above 360 days 
we follow the argumentation and methodology of Yu (2005).  
As our strategy is, theoretically, an arbitrage strategy we do not place outright 
directional bets on the market. As such, whenever we buy (sell) protection against default we 
also buy (sell) a certain amount of stock of the same issuer. In order to find the appropriate 
amount of stocks we should buy (sell) we have to calculate the so-called hedge ratio. The 
essential question is how much the CDS value reacts to a small move in the equity price. From 
here, one can compute the amount of shares necessary to offset such a movement. Formally, 








where V(t,T) denotes the value of the CDS contract in time t, and 𝑆𝑡 denotes the value of the 
stock in time t. As in classic option theory, the appropriate hedge ratio changes constantly. It is 
not feasible however to do it as trading costs would undermine the profitability of our strategy. 
Nevertheless, the algorithm applied in this study check every 60 days if the correct hedge ratio 
deviates more than 10% from the old hedge ratio. If this is the case, the hedge ratio is updated.  
  Following Duarte et al. (2007), we assume a 5% bid – ask spread for credit default 
swaps and no transaction costs for equities. As we only trade large and liquid corporations these 
assumptions seem reasonable. When buying a CDS contract we assume the CDS spread at 
which we are able to trade is the ask spread and therefore 2.5% higher than the mid spread 
quoted in the market. The opposite occurs when selling protection. Equation 25, instead of 
equation (22), is used to price the initial long position.  
𝑉(𝑡, 𝑇) = (𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑑(𝑡, 𝑇) − 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑘(0, 𝑇)) ∫ 𝑃(𝑡, 𝑠)𝑞𝑡(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑇
𝑡
    (25) 
Notice that if we would use market mid – spread, the initial value of our CDS position would 
be 0. For closing our long position, we either enter an offsetting short contract or we sell our 
existing long contract and thus we have to take into consideration the bid spread. 
We used the methodology provided by Wojtowicz (2014) which estimates the asset 
volatility by using a moving average of 252 CDS implied volatilities. Therefore, we only could 
start trading 253 days after the first CDS spreads were available. This leaves us with a time 







In this section we discuss the results of our strategy. We have implemented our strategy 
for three sets of companies based on their debt-to-equity ratio. For computational reasons, the 
survival probability was computed using the formula given by Finger et. al. (2002). 
Nevertheless, whenever the debt-to-equity ratio was found to be above the threshold provided 
by Kiesel and Veraart (2008), we turn to use the exact solution provided by the latter in order 
to calculate the model CDS spreads. 
We have divided our sample of 67 companies in three different sub portfolios differing 
by the company average debt-to-equity ratio during the burn-in period (i.e. from 05.12.2007 – 
04,12.2008).20. The “High Leverage”, “Medium Leverage” and “Low Leverage” portfolios are 
composed of 22, 23 and 22 firms, respectively. Table 3 presents some descriptive return 
statistics on all three portfolios. As one can see, the “Medium Leverage” portfolio outperforms 
all others in terms of Sharpe Ratio and Sortino Ratio. As literature suggests the CreditGrades 
model does not work well for very secure firms. In our case this can be seen in the very low 
annualized return of such companies. This outcome would be already expectable if we were 
trading with short – term maturities simply due to model misspecification. It is important to 
remind the reader that the CreditGrades model does not consider jumps. As such, it tends to 
produce very low spreads for short maturities in the case of very secure firms. This could lead 
our strategy to perform poorly. In our case, however, as we use 5 year CDS contracts, this could 
only be an issue in extreme cases such as L’Oreal, which has virtually no debt.  
Table 3 Descriptive Return Statistics for three sub portfolios.  
 
It is worth mentioning that our strategy is very dependent on trading opportunities, 
which seem not to be distributed evenly over time. The number of trades opened per year ranges 
between 3 (2012) and 35 (2008). Figure 4 shows a detailed split of opened trades per year as 
                                                          
20 Kiesel and Veraart (2008) use an equity to debt ratio, therefore a low ratio indicates an indebted company in 
their paper.  
High Leverage Medium Leverage Low Leverage Full Sample
Average Return Annualized 4.41% 2.86% 1.79% 3.00%
Standard Deviation Annualized 7.43% 2.60% 1.63% 3.40%
Sharpe Ratio 0.57 1.03 0.98 0.83
Skewness 2.00 5.07 5.57 4.37
Excess Kurtosis 50.59 80.71 108.46 77.44





well as the average performance for any given year. In 2008, the dominant strategy was to short 
CDS contracts (and equities). This can be explained with the course of the financial crisis. 
Notice that in 2008 CDS spreads exploded. In this context, our model has given strong signals 
to sell CDS contracts as this up rise was interpreted as some type of overreaction in CDS 
markets. In 2009 the number of trading opportunities diminished significantly with a slight bias 
in long CDS trades. We observed the highest return rates for our strategy during these two 
years. Following the sovereign debt crisis, trading opportunities emerged again in 2010 and 
2011. Shorting CDS became again the dominant strategy. Returns were nevertheless low during 
this years as result of some sort of lead – lag relationship between the number of trades and 
returns. As credit spreads normalized in the following years, our model detected less trading 
opportunities. The years of 2013 and 2014 featured a fairly high number of buy protection 
signals and low returns. This should be related with the new environment within capital markets 
that followed the quantitative easing program implemented by the ECB, which contributed to 
depress credit spreads to all-time lows. According to our model, spreads then were too tight and 
therefore our model produced mainly buy protection signals.  
Figure 4: Number of trades opened per year, split by nature of trades. 
 
Since trading opportunities tend to cluster in time, it is important to examine trading 
returns for different sub periods. Table 6 shows some descriptive return statistics for the “High 
Leverage” and Full Sample portfolios against some benchmarks for different periods. As this 
is a “plug and play” trading strategy, we try to use only investable investment products as our 
benchmarks. The EuroStoxx ETF of Deutsche Asset Management and the iShares Euro 
Corporate Bond Large Cap ETF were used as our equity and fixed income benchmarks, 
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no ETF on this index with a sufficiently large time series. As one can clearly see during the first 
time period (from 2008 to 2011), capital structure arbitrage (CSA) clearly outperformed all 
benchmarks based on the Sharpe ratio, Sortino ratio and absolute returns both in the “High 
Leverage” and the “Full Sample” cases. It is especially impressive to compare the performance 
of the equity market between 2008 and 2011 with our strategy. Our strategy is able to generate 
a higher return and a lower standard deviation than the equity market in the same period. In the 
second period, absolute returns and risk-adjusted performance measures decreased. If one 
regards the Sortino Ratio, our strategies still outperform all our benchmarks. Our Sortino Ratios 
from 2012 to 2015 are 0.1622 (Full Sample) and 0.2795 (High Leverage). Our equity and fixed 
income benchmarks only have Sortino Ratios of 0.1275 and 0.1610, respectively. In addition, 
notice that the higher moments of our return distribution are also favourable to our strategy. For 
all periods, we observe a higher excess kurtosis and a higher positive skewness than our 
benchmarks.  
Table 4: Descriptive return statistics for capital structure arbitrage (CSA) and benchmarks. Panel A features the time period between 8.12.2008 
and 31.12.2011, Panel B features the time period between 01.01.2012 and 31.12.2015 and finally Panel C features the time whole time period 
between 08.12.2008 – 31.12.2015. Our benchmarks are, the EuroStoxx ETF of Deutsche Asset Management, the iShares Euro Corporate Bond 
Large Cap ETF and the VIX index on the S&P 500. 
 
CSA (Full Sample) CSA (High Leverage) Fixed Income Equity Volatility
Average Return (annualized) 6.44% 9.55% 2.19% 8.13% 33.41%
Standard Deviation (annualized) 5.11% 11.27% 5.34% 27.76% 115.68%
Sharpe Ratio (annualized) 1.22 0.83 0.37 0.29 0.29
Sortino Ratio (daily) 0.4815 0.3275 0.0878 0.0531 0.0549
Max. Drawdown -3.36% -7.50% -4.62% -16.29% -46.99%
Skewness 2.84 1.24 0.17 0.50 1.50
Exess Kurtosis 32.83 20.39 19.76 3.82 6.22
CSA (Full Sample) CSA (High Leverage) Fixed Income Equity Volatility
Average Return (annualized) 0.40% 0.49% 2.29% 13.16% 60.22%
Standard Deviation (annualized) 0.59% 0.68% 2.76% 19.01% 117.80%
Sharpe Ratio (annualized) 0.35 0.44 0.76 0.68 0.51
Sortino Ratio (daily) 0.1622 0.2795 0.1610 0.1275 0.0965
Max. Drawdown -0.34% -0.71% -2.11% -12.71% -51.84%
Skewness 0.10 -0.39 -0.91 -0.04 1.19
Exess Kurtosis 15.16 27.30 3.83 1.69 5.14
CSA (Full Sample) CSA (High Leverage) Fixed Income Equity Volatility
Average Return (annualized) 3.00% 4.41% 2.09% 11.36% 48.41%
Standard Deviation (annualized) 3.40% 7.43% 4.08% 23.21% 116.83%
Sharpe Ratio (annualized) 0.83 0.57 0.46 0.48 0.41
Sortino Ratio (daily) 0.4179 0.3241 0.1100 0.0910 0.0784
Max. Drawdown -3.36% -7.50% -4.64% -16.29% -51.83%
Skewness 4.37 2.00 -4.29 0.00 -4.29








Also interesting is to analyse the evolution of our portfolio value and compare it with 
our benchmarks (Figure 5). Please note the volatility of all time series has been scaled in order 
to match exactly the volatility of our fixed income benchmark (4.08% annualized)21. The 
superior performance of our strategy in the years from 2008 to 2012 is particularly clear in this 
figure. This contrasts with the descending performance thereafter, especially in the period 
between 2012 and 2015. The fact that the latter period has been marked by low volatility may 
have led to a reduction in the number of trades in this period (see figure 3). It seems that only 
in turbulent market phases, such as 2008 – 2009, 2011-2012 and the end of 2015 we are able to 
produce significant returns.  
Figure 5: Indexed wealth evolution for our strategy, the equity benchmark and fixed income benchmark. The volatility of all strategies has 
been scaled to match the volatility of the fixed income benchmark of 4,08% annualized.  
 
A key driver on the performance of capital structure arbitrage is the ability of our model 
to produce the right trigger signals. Of all our closed trades, 54.55% ended in full convergence 
meaning that both equity and debt markets have moved in favourable direction. Even more 
important is the number of profitable trades. Our strategy was able to produce positive returns 
in 76,52% of all closed trades. This implies that in only 38% of all partial convergence trades, 
our hedge ratio has been insufficient and a loss occurred. We have not found any previous 
                                                          
21 This procedure ensures wealth evolutions of different strategies are comparable. One assumes an investor is 
willing to take a certain level of volatility. One can achieve this level of volatility for any strategy by mixing the 
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studies to compare our results. However, these results confirm the effectiveness of our 
computations of the hedge ratios. 
Table 5: Quality of Trades, in the second column one can see the 
absolute number of trades, and in the third column the respective 
percentage share of all trades. 
 
Also relevant to understand our strategy performance is to monitor the contribution of 
the CDS and equity positions to the overall return of our strategy. Table 5 shows descriptive 
return statistics for both the CDS and equity positions in our strategy for the full sample. One 
can see that most of the return produced by our strategy comes from the CDS leg. Surprisingly, 
only in terms of the Sharpe Ratio one can conclude there is a diversification effect when 
combining both legs together. The maximum drawdown do not point to the existence of a clear 
diversification effect. It is also surprising that the standard deviation of our capital structure 
arbitrage strategy is higher than for both legs alone. 
Table 6: Descriptive Return Statistics CDS vs. Equity leg. 
 
For risk management purposes, it is important to monitor the number of trades that 
remain open in each moment in type (active trades). This is shown in Figure 5. In particular, 
the number of open short trades is an important risk indicator. As said in section 5 there are 
several risks associated with shorting a large number of CDS contracts. Based on the strategy 
implemented in this study, a maximum of 37 open short trades was reached on the 02.01.2009.  
% of Trades
Convergence 54.55%
Only CDS Convergence 28.03%
Only Equity Convergence 7.58%
Divergence 9.85%
Sum of all Ended Trades 100.00%
Profitable Trades 76.52%
Quality of Trades
CDS leg Equity leg CSA Strategy
Average Return Annualized 2.58% 0.71% 3.00%
Standard Deviation Annualized 2.91% 1.73% 3.40%
Sharpe Ratio 0.82 0.30 0.83
Skewness 8.68 0.67 4.37
Excess Kurtosis 194.66 46.82 77.44
Sortino Ratio (daily) 0.4266 0.1548 0.4179
Max Drawdown -2.81% -1.96% -3.36%




Figure 6: Number of active trades open on each day 
 
As our strategy is typically a strategy used by hedge fund and other high fee charging 
investment companies, it is very crucial to discuss the capability of producing abnormal returns 
or alpha. Especially hedge funds clients, which pay a 20% performance fee and 2% base fee for 
assets under management, are very interested to see if simple low cost investment vehicles can 
reproduce a strategy’s returns. We ran several regressions to see to what extend our strategy is 
able to produce abnormal returns as compared to simple buy and hold strategies in our 
benchmarks22. Table 7 shows the results of those regressions. We can conclude our strategy is 
only partly able to produce positive and statistical significant abnormal returns on a daily basis. 
To compute our alpha we used a two factor regression of our strategies against the equity and 
the fixed income benchmark. We excluded the VIX as buy and hold investors typically do not 
invest in volatility over prolonged period of time. In the first sub period our “Full Sample” 
portfolio achieves an alpha of 5.44% annualized, which is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. In the second sub period however, only our “High Leverage” portfolio is able to generate 
an annualized alpha of 0.5%, which is statistically significant at the 10% level. For the whole 
sample period the picture is the same as in the first sub period, only the “Full Sample” portfolio 
is able to produce a positive alpha (2.3% annualized), which is significant at the 10% level.  
We also would like to discuss the different factor loadings of our single factor 
regressions. As this gives us more insight, which markets are crucial for our strategy. It is 
interesting to see the factor loadings for our fixed income benchmark are only significant in the 
second sub period. For the first sub period and the whole sample period there is no statistical 
                                                          
22 We have not considered any fees for performance or assets under management in our regressions. 
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evidence our returns depend on returns of the European fixed income market. Only in the time 
period of quantitative easing our strategy seems to be dependent on European fixed income 
returns. This could be explained by the fact, that only large movements in the risk free rate 
affect our strategy. Such movements were caused by the aggressive ECB policy in this time 
period. The dependence on the equity market however is statistically significant at the 1% level 
for all periods. Very interesting are the factor loadings of the regressions on the VIX index. The 
factor loadings are negative for the full time period. In this period, factor loadings are significant 
at the 1% level, for the “High Leverge” and “Full Sample” portfolio. These results could support 
our hypothesis of the lead – lag relationship between returns on the VIX and our strategy. One 
could expect negative factor loadings for the VIX for a capital structure arbitrage strategy as in 
principal we are betting on convergence, which usually happens as financial markets become 





Table 7: Regression results of our capital structure arbitrage strategies. Regressions were run on excess returns of our 
strategies and the benchmarks respectively. Significant results are marked by *. *** results are significant at 1% level, ** 
results are significant at 5% level and * results are significant at 10% level. In Panel A regressions were run from 2008 – 
2011, in Panel B from 2012 – 2015 and Panel C covers the whole period between 2008 and 2015 
Alpha Equity Fixed Income
High Leverage 0.00031    0.14575*** 0.04011 
Full Sample 0.00021** 0.06278*** 0.05067
Alpha Fixed Income
High Leverage 0.00036  -0.05805
Full Sample 0.00023** 0.00839
Alpha Equity
High Leverage 0.00031  0.14475***
Full Sample 0.00022** 0.06152***
Alpha VIX
High Leverage 0.00037    -0.01282***
Full Sample 0.00024** -0.00538***
Alpha Equity Fixed Income
High Leverage 0.00002* -0.0068*** 0.01454*    
Full Sample 0.00001  0.00361*** 0.02348***
Alpha Fixed Income
High Leverage 0.00002 0.01692**  
Full Sample 0.00002 0.02222***
Alpha Equity
High Leverage 0.00003* -0.00691***
Full Sample 0.00002  0.00344***
Alpha VIX
High Leverage 0.00002  0.00091***
Full Sample 0.00002* -0.00024      
Alpha Equity Fixed Income
High Leverage 0.00013    0.08698*** 0.01232  
Full Sample 0.00009*  0.03993*** 0.03526*
Alpha Fixed Income
High Leverage 0.00017    -0.03889
Full Sample 0.00011** 0.01176
Alpha Equity
High Leverage 0.00013    0.08676***
Full Sample 0.00009*  0.03929***
Alpha VIX
High Leverage 0.00018    -0.00492***










This study has confirmed some of our expectations about the performance of a capital 
structure arbitrage strategy. We proposed a new system to identify mispricing between CDS 
markets and equity markets. Our trigger system is based on the average deviation between the 
model and the market spread and the standard deviation of these residuals. This system has 
several advantages over the static trigger system used in previous studies. Our methodology is 
able to adapt to new environments, such as a structural change in the speed of the price 
discovery process. Using this methodology, we are able to outperform all our benchmarks in 
the time period between 2008 and 2015 with regards to Sharpe and Sortino Ratio. The 
outperformance was especially severe in the first part of our sample period. In the first sub 
period our strategy is able to produce Sharpe Ratios which are nearly four times as high as the 
ones of our benchmarks. Also in terms of absolute returns, the first sub period has been very 
successful as we were able to produce annualized returns of up to 9.55% (High Leverage). In 
the second part of the period our absolute returns dropped significantly. In this sub period our 
strategy is only able to outperform our all our benchmarks if one regards the Sortino Ratio. To 
see if our strategy is able to produce positive abnormal returns we ran several regressions. For 
both sub period as well as the whole sample period, we ran daily two factor regressions of our 
excess returns on the equity and fixed income benchmark. During the first sub period, our alpha 
for the “Full Sample” period is positive and significant. For the second sub period, only our 
“High Leverage” portfolio is able to produce an alpha, which is significant at the 10% level. If 
one examines the wealth evolution in this period closer, one notices positive returns of our 
strategy cluster in time. Therefore, we can conclude our strategy is not able to deliver constant 
and significant abnormal returns in all periods.  
While this article shed light on the risk and return properties of capital structure arbitrage 
strategies, there is still further research to be done to completely understand all its properties. 
First of all, we would like to hint, that our study has to be extended and an robust out of sample 
optimization procedure should be implemented. Furthermore, in this article there is a survival 
bias. We only included the largest European companies of which none went bankrupt in our 
sample period. We have no insights how our strategy would react to bankruptcies. Thirdly it 
would be very interesting to what extend the performance of the model depends on the sectors 
chosen. This and previous studies have mainly focused on leverage ratios or ratings. Most 




and our Capital Structure Arbitrage strategy proofs to be significant after conducting various 
statistical tests. 
To implement our strategy a very thorough risk management is necessary. As pointed 
out earlier, capital structure arbitrage is not in fact risk free. By computing the expected 
variation in equity markets following a certain variation in CDS markets, we try to hedge our 
positions and thus minimize risk. However, investors must be aware that our computations are 
subject to model risk. In addition, even if there was no model risk, it is important to emphasize 
the fact that any optimal hedge ratios is dynamic. Thus, investors are subject to risk, even 
theoretically, unless they continuously update their hedge ratio. This is very relevant given the 
highly non-linear relation between equity and CDS. This type of relation puts capital structure 
arbitrageurs in risk as their hedge ratio tends to be clearly insufficient, especially when default 
occurs unexpectedly. As there are times when we sell a large number of CDS contracts investors 
are exposed to default risks of many obligors. These risks have to be monitored and controlled 
using some type of value-at-risk approach where default correlations of different obligors are 
taken into account. A thorough risk management process is not only crucial for financiers, also 
other market participants will focus on the process supplementing our strategy. Especially in 
the case when we short CDS contracts, the protection buyer wants to be certain we can fulfil 
our swap agreement in the case of default. If there are only minor doubts that one can fulfil their 
obligations, one is subject to a counter party risk premium. This means one would only receive 
smaller premiums as the protection buyer is pricing in the risk, of a default of the protection 
seller. As one can see to implement such a procedure is very crucial on different levels. 
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Average Return (annualized) -0.36%
Standard Deviation (annualized) 1.19%
Sharpe Ratio (annualized) -0.47
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In the chart below one sees graphically how a trigger mechanism could work. Whenever the 
market spreads is below the lower boundary or above the upper boundary a trade would be 
entered. This example a first long trade would have been entered just after the 17/05/2009. As 
soon as market and model spreads trade within a specific range (not shown in this chart), trades 












































The following table shows the difference in descriptive return statistics for the trigger system 
proposed in this article denoted as MA (Moving Average) and the benchmark as used in 
Wojtowicz (2014) denoted as CT (Constant Triggers).  
 
Appendix G: Descriptive return statistics for capital structure arbitrage (CSA) featuring a moving average trigger system and a 
constant trigger system.. Panel A features the time period between 8.12.2008 and 31.12.2011, Panel B features the time period 
between 01.01.2012 and 31.12.2015 and finally Panel C features the time whole time period between 08.12.2008 – 31.12.2015. 
MA (Full Sample) CT (Full Sample)
Average Return (annualized) 6.44% 5.88%
Standard Deviation (annualized) 5.11% 5.04%
Sharpe Ratio (annualized) 1.22 1.13
Sortino Ratio (daily) 0.48 0.47
Max. Drawdown -3.36% -3.36%
Skewness 2.84 3.08
Excess Kurtosis 32.83 36.32
MA (Full Sample) CT (Full Sample)
Average Return (annualized) 0.40% -0.27%
Standard Deviation (annualized) 0.59% 0.71%
Sharpe Ratio (annualized) 0.35 -0.65
Sortino Ratio (daily) 0.1622 -0.0734
Max. Drawdown -0.34% -0.57%
Skewness 0.10 -0.44
Excess Kurtosis 15.16 5.15
MA (Full Sample) CT (Full Sample)
Average Return (annualized) 3.00% 2.39%
Standard Deviation (annualized) 3.40% 3.36%
Sharpe Ratio (annualized) 0.83 0.65
Sortino Ratio (daily) 0.4179 0.3197
Max. Drawdown -3.36% -3.36%
Skewness 4.37 4.66
Excess Kurtosis 77.44 83.71









For the following table we have computed portfolios consisting of weekly (monthly) 
returns for changes in CDS spread and changes in equity prices. For these portfolios 











05/12/2008 05/12/2009 05/12/2010 05/12/2011 05/12/2012 05/12/2013 05/12/2014 05/12/2015
Moving Average vs. Constant Trigger
Moving Average Full Sample Constant Trigger Full Sample
2009- 2011 2012 -2015
Average (daily) -25.57% -25.08%
Average (weekly) -34.67% -33.13%
Average (monthly) -43.45% -45.39%
-33.59%
-43.56%
Rank Correlation changes in CDS Spreads and Equity Prices
Full Sample
-25.33%
Discriptive Statistics of Correlation Measurements
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